Their attempts to correct the incorrect and mistaken steps of the Chinese workers in the resolution of technical questions in production are frequently rejected, and their advice, based on contemporary scientific knowledge and technical experience, is loudly declared to be outdated and conservative. The Soviet specialists in China are in a deceitful predicament [ lozhnom polozhenii ], in which in essence they have been deprived of the possibility of successfully fulfilling their tasks and of using their knowledge and experience.
Soviet people, arriving in the PRC with the passionate hope of helping the Chinese in the construction of socialism, naturally, are unable to understand why they are treated this way. They cannot endure this environment of distrust and suspicion, in which they must fulfill their responsibilities.
It is therefore not surprising that many of the Soviet specialists have began to request to be allowed to return to their homeland. In light of all of this we have come to the conclusion that the further presence of the Soviet specialists in the PRC is in practical terms impossible. We have instructed our ambassador in Beijing to communicate to the government of the PRC this decision of the Soviet government to withdraw the Soviet specialists in accordance with their own wish.
We have noted all of these circumstances, including the fact that the government of the PRC earlier itself requested the dispatch of a whole series of specialists. We are convinced that this measure is necessary in the interests of correct mutual relations between the Soviet Union and China.
A copy of the note that we sent to the government of the PRC, in which all this has been communicated, is included here. Khruschev reports Chinese dissatisfaction with Soviet specialists that had been placed in China to aid in socialist economic, cultural, and military development. It is the most consistent democratic force and the most resolute fighter against imperialism. It is the force which will surmount our national disaster. The working class alone has a great historical aim: socialism.
The future therefore belongs to it, together with all working men and women. The bitter experience of the past has taught us that the working class can only take the lead in building the new, free, and indivisible German republic and can only then achieve the reform of all political, economic, cultural, and intellectual relationships and the building of socialism, if it overcomes the split in its own ranks, if it creates the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and gathers the entire working population around it.
The fusion of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and of the Communist Party of Germany is therefore the demand of the hour, whose fulfillment brooks no delay. Back in the summer of , the KPD had set up its own party apparatus in close collaboration with the Soviet occupying power. But it soon became clear that the KPD enjoyed little popular political support, and the party changed its position.
In the fall of , with massive Soviet support, it launched a campaign to merge with the SPD. Although the vast majority of SPD supporters approved only a close cooperation between the two parties, and not a complete merger, Grotewohl eventually yielded to KPD pressure. Krenz: This is not our way. Gorbachev: You need to take this into account in your relationship with the FRG. Otherwise we will be forced to accept all kinds of ultimatums. Maybe we can direct our International Departments and Foreign Ministries to think about possible initiatives together.
Clearly, your constructive steps should be accompanied with demands for certain obligations from the other side. Chancellor Helmut Kohl keeps in touch with me and with you. We need to influence him. Once under the pressure of the opposition, he found himself on the horse of nationalism. The right wing starts to present their demands for the unification of Germany to the Soviet Union, and appeals to the US. The logic is simple—all the peoples are united, why do we Germans not have this right?
Krenz: We have already taken a number of steps. First of all, we gave orders to the border troops not to use weapons at the border, except in the cases of direct attacks on the soldiers. Secondly, we adopted a draft of Law on Foreign Travel at the Politburo.
He immediately gave me a telephone call regarding that. Krenz: Yes, he is worried; I noticed it in my conversation with him. He was even forgetting to finish phrases. Gorbachev: Kohl, it seems, is not a big intellectual, but he enjoys certain popularity in his country, especially among the petit-bourgeois public. But we do not have any ill feelings towards him.
Had he made the right conclusions two or three years ago, it would have been of major significance for the GDR, and for him personally. In any case, one cannot deny the things your Party and people have achieved in the past. We have a complete mutual understanding about that. Krenz cordially thanks Gorbachev for the support, openness, and good advice. Soviet record of conversation between M. Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich, Language Original language.
Available translation Any English Korean. Original language Available translation. Chernyaev, Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, f. Document summary Soviet record of conversation between M. Document information Source Notes of A. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws.
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