Why is democracy important today

Many were geographically remote from each other. Response: The most sophisticated statistical analyses of the evidence for the democratic peace take these variables into account and still conclude that there is a strong relationship between democracy and peace.

The Argument: Skeptics suggest that, if the democratic peace proposition is valid, we should find that pairs of democracies behave in crises in way that reveals that shared democracy, not considerations of power and interest, caused them to avoid war. For example, tracing the process of how events unfolded should reveal that the publics in democracies did not want war with other democracies, that leaders did not make military threats against other democracies, and that democracies adopted accommodating behavior toward other democracies.

Response: Proponents of the democratic-peace proposition do not deny that considerations of power and interest often motivate states. Thus evidence that democracies are sensitive to power and interest does not refute the democratic-peace proposition. In addition, critics of the democratic-peace proposition have not tested it fairly; they have not deduced the full range of predictions that the normative and institutional model makes about how democracies will avoid war.

More comprehensive tests would also deduce and test hypotheses about how many political and diplomatic aspects of crises between democratic states differ from other crises. Such tests would also compare pairs of democratic states to mixed and nondemocratic pairs.

John Owen has conducted such tests and finds considerable evidence to support the democratic-peace proposition. The Argument: One of the most important arguments against U. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder make this argument and support it with statistical evidence that shows a correlation between democratization and war.

They suggest that several causal mechanisms explain why democratization tends to lead to war. First, old elites play the nationalist card in an effort to incite conflict so that they can retain power. Second, in emerging democracies without strong democratic institutions new rulers compete for support by playing the nationalist card and search for foreign scapegoats for failures. The argument that democratization causes war does not directly challenge the usual form of the democratic peace proposition.

Mansfield and Snyder recognize that "It is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. Responses: Mansfield and Snyder have advanced an important new argument, but even if partially true, it does not refute the case for spreading democracy internationally.

Promoting democracy makes more sense than this course, because the risks of democratization are not so high and uncontrollable that we should give up on attempts to spread democracy. First, there are reasons to doubt the strength of the relationship between democratization and war. Other quantitative studies challenge the statistical significance of Mansfield and Snyder's results, suggest that there is an even stronger connection between movements toward autocracy and the onset of war, find that it is actually unstable transitions and reversals of democratization that increase the probability of war, and argue that democratization diminishes the likelihood of militarized international disputes.

Mansfield and Snyder themselves point out that "reversals of democratization are nearly as risky as democratization itself," thereby bolstering the case for assisting the consolidation of new democracies. Of these countries, only Slovenia was involved in brief series of military skirmishes with Serbia. Countries such as Mongolia and South Africa appear to have made the transition to democracy without going to war. The new democracies plagued by the most violence, including some former Soviet republics and the republics of the former Yugoslavia, are those that are the least democratic and may not qualify as democracies at all.

All of this evidence suggests that whatever may have increased the war-proneness of democratizing states in the past may not be present in the contemporary international system. It may be that states making the transition from feudalism to democracy became more war-prone or that the emerging democracies of the 19th century were European great powers that embarked on imperial wars of conquest.

These factors will not lead today's new democracies into war. Finally, if the democratic peace proposition is correct, the higher proportion of democracies in the current international system may further reduce the risk that new democracies will not engage in war, because they will find themselves in a world of many democracies instead of one of many potentially hostile nondemocracies.

Second, it is possible to control any risks of war posed by democratization. Mansfield and Snyder identify several useful policies to mitigate any potential risks of democratization. Old elites that are threatened by democratization can be given "golden parachutes" that enable them to at least retain some of their wealth and to stay out of jail. The Arguments: One of the most prominent recent criticisms of attempts to promote democracy claims that democratic elections often have few positive effects, especially in countries that do not have liberal societies or other socioeconomic conditions such as a large middle class and a high level of economic development.

These arguments imply that electoral democracy may be undesirable in many countries and that the United States should not encourage its spread. Democratically elected governments may turn out to be illiberal regimes that oppress their citizens.

Responses: These criticisms of electoral democracy are important reminders that democracy is imperfect and so are democracies. They also call attention to the need to promote the spread of liberal principles, as well as democratic electoral procedures. They do not, however, amount to a persuasive case against U. First, Zakaria overstates the extent to which new democracies are illiberal or are becoming so.

He classifies countries as "democratizing" if their combined Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties each measured on a 7-point scale with 1 denoting the most freedom and 7 the least fall between 5 and He regards countries as illiberal if they have a greater degree of political freedom than civil liberties. Zakaria's claim that there is a growing number of illiberal democracies may be correct.

After all, there are now more emerging democracies. But whether states have fewer civil liberties than political rights is a problematic way to distinguish between liberal and illiberal democracies. In no case is the difference greater than 2 points. Moreover, classifying countries as illiberal on the basis of whether they have more civil liberties than political rights leads to some absurd distinctions.

For example, Zakaria's criteria would classify France as an illiberal democracy because it scores higher on political rights 1 than civil liberties 2 , and Gabon as a liberal democracy because its civil liberties score 4 is higher than its political rights 5.

Zakaria notes that he does not rely on Freedom House for classifications of individual states, only for overall statistical measures. Freedom House's ratings show that civil liberties have improved in 10 of the countries Zakaria identifies as "democratizing" and fallen in only 4. The most recent Freedom House ratings also show that 81 of democracies are now classified as "free" whereas only 76 of were "free" in Thus there actually seems to be a slight trend toward liberalization, even as the overall number of democracies remains constant.

Second, Zakaria and Kaplan overlook the extent to which the holding of elections is a an important way of removing authoritarian leaders, and b part of the process of encouraging the growth of liberal values.

The principle that leaders should be selected in free and fair elections can become an international norm that can be used to persuade authoritarian leaders to step aside, sometimes gracefully. Marcos in the Philippines and Pinochet in Chile were removed from power largely because of the growing international belief in the electoral principle. It is hard to imagine that elections in Burma, for example, could produce an outcome worse than the current SLORC regime. Elections do not only remove unpopular authoritarians, however; they also encourage the development of liberal habits and principles such as freedom of speech and of the press.

Holding a free and fair election requires that these principles be followed. Elections alone do not guarantee that constitutional liberalism and the rule of law will be adopted, but they do focus the attention of the voting public on the process of freely electing their governments.

Third, it is not clear what forms of government the United States should support instead of democracy. Zakaria believes the United States should "encourage the gradual development of constitutional liberalism across the globe. There are few contemporary examples of liberal countries that are not democracies. Zakaria cites Hong Kong under British rule as an example, but this experience of a liberal imperial power engaging in a rather benign authoritarian rule over a flourishing free-market economy has already ended and is unlikely to be repeated.

Earlier historical examples of liberal nondemocracies include Britain in the early 19th century, and possibly other European constitutional monarchies of that century. As Marc Plattner and Carl Gershman of the National Endowment for Democracy point out, none of the examples is a "practical vision" for the 21st century. Thus it is difficult to see how Zakaria's analysis can support a viable U.

Fourth, Kaplan and, to a lesser extent, Zakaria, exaggerate the degree to which elections per se are responsible for the problems of new democracies, many of which had the same problems before elections were held. In the area of ethnic conflict, for example, democratic elections may ameliorate existing conflicts instead of exacerbating them.

The evidence is mixed, but the need to build electoral coalitions and the liberal practices of free speech and freedom of association necessary to hold elections may promote ethnic accommodation, not hostility. These arguments suggest that Zakaria, Kaplan, and other critics of electoral democracy have taken the valid point that "elections are not enough" too far. The United States should support democracy and liberalism; supporting only the latter risks not achieving either.

The most important contemporary ideological challenge to democracy comes from East Asia and has been called "soft authoritarianism" or the "Asian values" argument.

Many African countries are reportedly attracted by this model of government. Asian "soft authoritarianism" merits attention for two reasons. First, it is emerging as the most prominent, articulate, and comprehensive critique of liberal democracy. Second, the countries that advocate it were, at least until the second half of , among the most dynamic economies in the world. Their growing economic power has increased their influence in international affairs.

Their recent economic turmoil is probably only a temporary setback, and the fact that it disrupted financial markets around the world testifies to the growing economic importance of these countries. Asian attempts to articulate a distinctive "Asian way" and to criticize liberal democratic principles have provoked broader debates on the difference between Asian and Western cultures, whether there is a uniquely Asian approach to politics and economics, and the international implications of East Asia's rise.

The Arguments: East Asian critics of democracy make the following arguments for why the spread of democracy-particularly to East Asia-is not desirable. First, Western democracy allows for too much liberty, and this excessive individual freedom causes moral decline and social collapse.

Third, and most generally, some East Asians claim that liberal democracy is not a suitable form of government for Asian countries, because Asia has a different set of cultural values that include a strong emphasis on communalism. Responses: Each of these arguments for the undesirability of democracy is seriously flawed. The first argument-that democracy causes moral decline and social disintegration-is not persuasive, because not all liberal democracies suffer such ills.

Canada and most European countries demonstrate that liberal democracy does not cause social collapse. These countries are indisputably democratic, but they are far less violent than the United States, and they do not have America's social problems.

In , the Population Reference Bureau reported that Americans kill each other at a rate 17 times higher than in Japan and Ireland, 10 times the rates in Germany and France, and five times the rate in Canada.

The United Nations Demographic Yearbook shows homicide rates per , population for several countries in , the most recent year available. Canada's was 2. Portugal and Spain came in at 1. The American culture of individualism, not more universal liberal and democratic values, is responsible for many U. The argument that democracy exacerbates ethnic tensions also is unpersuasive. Managing ethnic tensions in multiethnic societies isn't easy, but democratic approaches may be at least as successful as authoritarian ones.

Authoritarian states that appeared to control ethnic tensions often did so at a high price in human life. The Soviet Union avoided ethnic civil war, but under Stalin it decimated or deported many ethnic minorities.

Tito's Yugoslavia avoided violent disintegration, but hundreds of thousands of suspected separatists were killed on Tito's orders, particularly in the late s. Considerable evidence indicates that liberal democracy, with its emphasis on tolerance, cooperation, political accommodation, and respect for civil liberties, provides the best recipe for long-term domestic stability.

The third argument's assertion that democratic government is incompatible with East Asian values is belied by the relatively successful growth of democracy in Japan, South Korea, and, more recently, Taiwan and the Philippines.

These states have not emulated the Western model of democracy in all respects, but they are almost universally classified as democracies.

In addition to conducting multiparty elections and maintaining civil liberties, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all have impressive economic records. Some East Asians point to the Philippines and argue that democracy is responsible for its domestic instability and economic malaise, but that country's economic performance has improved dramatically in recent years. In addition, the Korean and Japanese cases show that democracy and growth can go hand in hand.

The former problems of the Philippines may be attributable to the Spanish colonial legacy, not the flaws of democratic political systems. The economic and financial crises that swept across many Asian countries in and have muted many of the loudest voices that argued for "Asian values" and "soft authoritarianism. Nevertheless, it seems likely that proponents of "Asian values" will offer a less strident challenge to liberal and democratic values in the future and that Asian countries will pursue political liberalization as part of their economic reforms.

At least some of the current economic difficulties in Asian countries can be attributed to a lack of public accountability. The recent critiques of U. The international spread of democracy will offer many benefits to new democracies and to the United States. Establishing that promoting democracy is beneficial does not, however, resolve all the questions that surround U. These questions include: Can the United States encourage the spread of democracy or must democracy always develop indigenously?

How can the United States promote democracy in other countries? Which policies work and under what circumstances do they work? Any comprehensive case for why the United States should promote democracy must address these questions.

Note 3: Quoted in Henry S. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. At least some members of the Clinton administration continue to argue for promoting democracy. Note 5: Robert D. Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment? Note 8: Philippe C. Plattner, eds. Note Samuel P.

Note For discussions of the differences between ancient and modern conceptions of democracy, see M. I am indebted to Bradley A. Thayer for reminding me of this important distinction.

Note Although the term "liberal" has become an epithet hurled at those on the left of the American political spectrum, virtually all American politicians and most of those in Europe embrace the basic principles of liberalism.

Liberalism is most closely associated with the political thought of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, although Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith also contributed to its development.

Note Some liberals, however, regard electoral democracy as one of the "core norms" of liberalism. See, for example, Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. Note Many political and moral philosophers have addressed this issue and it would be impossible to do full justice to their arguments in this essay.

Two good places to start exploring these issues are Charles R. For a brief overview and evaluation of the contending positions in the debate over whether there are moral obligations to foreigners, see Joseph S.

Nye, Jr. Note More generally, democracies are more likely to enjoy political stability. Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. Note R. Rummel presents his definition explicitly: "By democracy is meant liberal democracy, where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise loosely understood as including at least two-thirds of adult males ; where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights.

Note See Rudolph J. Rummel calls genocide and mass murder "democide," and distinguishes such killings from battle deaths. He reports that between and over million people died in democides, compared to about 34 million battle death in wars. See also Rummel, Power Kills, chap.

Emphasis in original. For a more detailed elaboration of Rummel's explanation, see Power Kills, especially chapter Note Kim R. Sen makes it clear that democracy may not be a necessary condition for preventing famines, it does appear to be sufficient.

Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds. Martin's, , p. Note Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," pp. Sen points out that the democratic political processes that prevent famines may be less effective in avoiding less urgent problems such as nonextreme hunger, illiteracy, and gender discrimination. Note Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," p. A considerable body of opinion suggests that famines and hunger are not caused by a global or country-by-country shortage of food but by the failure to distribute food to those who most need it.

See Collins, "World Hunger," pp. Many Indians have, however, suffered from hunger and malnutrition since , but the country has avoided the catastrophic famines that previously plagued it. Note Jack S. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds. Note Michael W. Reprinted in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds. Note See Stuart A. Are the Freer Countries More Pacific? Note For one of the earliest statements of this finding, see Melvin Small and J.

Rummel, for example, claims that libertarian states, which tend to be more democratic than others, are less likely to resort to international violence. Such states will at least inflict fewer casualties in wars, even if they go to war as often as other types of states. Some studies find that disputes between democracies and nondemocracies are less likely to escalate to war that disputes between nondemocracies, See Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolai, "Regime Types and International Conflict, ," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.

Clifton Morgan and Sally H. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. David Lake also suggests that democracies have advantages in the conduct of international politics, but concludes that this advantage makes democracies more likely to win wars. See David A. Russett and Maoz find that the normative model is more powerful. Note David P. Note Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the s, p. For the argument that population growth is higher in authoritarian regimes, regardless of their level of wealth, see Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Democracy and Development," paper presented to the Nobel Symposium on Democracy's Victory and Crisis, Uppsala University, Sweden, August , , pp.

Note See Robert I. Note Randolph M. Note David E. Note Huntington, The Third Wave, p. Cambridge, Mass. Porter, "Is the Zone of Peace Stable? Waltz, "America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective.

Note An earlier criticism claimed that proponents of the democratic peace had failed to develop a theoretical explanation of the empirical finding that democracies do not fight each other. This criticism is no longer valid, because there is no longer any shortage of explanations. Instead, proponents of the democratic peace have advanced several explanations and they continue to explicate and refine the logic of each.

Note John J. Note For this variant of realism, see Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future. See, for example, Charles L. On balance, realist theories lead to the conclusion that democracies cannot enjoy a perpetual peace, not that democracies often will be at war. Recently, some scholars have combined realist theories with elements of explanations of the democratic peace. Note For contending perspectives on relative gains, see David A. Baldwin, ed. For a pessimistic realist view of how concern over relative gains inhibits cooperation, see John J.

Note See Baldwin, ed. Note See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. Note that proponents of the institutional-structural explanation agree that the logic of the model predicts that democracies will be less belligerent toward all types of states.

Note Kant argued: "If the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game. Note Layne, "Kant or Cant," p. Note On the weaknesses of the normative explanation more generally, see Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, pp.

In addition to above cases, others that are mentioned frequently include: Lebanon-Israel, ; Germany in the s; and Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Note Ibid. Note Stephen M.

Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," also finds that democracies have a strong tendency to ally with other democracies. Note Edward D. See also Andrew J. Mansfield and Snyder reply in ibid. Mansfield and Snyder object to Enterline's focus on militarized international disputes MIDs instead of wars, but a strong case can be made for this choice. Wars usually come out of MIDs, which create the opportunity for leaders to play nationalist cards and to otherwise behave and Mansfield and Snyder fear.

Note Marc F. Note The relationship between liberalism, democracy, and ethnic conflict is complex. See Michael E. Brown, ed. Montville, ed. Note Historically, of course, democracy has faced ideological challenges from Marxism, Fascism, and Monarchism. None of these is a significant force in contemporary world politics, so I have focused on the challenge from proponents of "Asian Values.

Note Howard W. A Debate Cambridge, Mass. Allison, Jr. Beschel, Jr. These links are posted as a courtesy. The original English version is authoritative and should be used when citing or quoting the paper. Journal Article - Research Policy. However, demand for democracy and political freedoms in Africa remains high, if often disappointed, as Afrobarometer data show.

Positive changes to bring about or protect democracy in Malawi and Sudan for example, have been led by young people, women and increasingly well-established civil society groups and journalists.

Thinkers such as Amartya Sen argue democratic values are essential to successful development, pointing out no substantial famine has ever occurred in an independent and democratic country with a relatively free press.

He cites the example of India , where the last famine in took place under British colonial rule. This perception of a link between democracy and development has ebbed and flowed over the last century, as communism rose and fell and the economic balance of the world shifted from West to East.

In the s, s, and s communism seemed capable of lifting millions of people out of poverty while building vast new industries, winning wars, and delivering cutting edge science. But towards the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had stagnated and communism seemed doomed to stifle innovation and growth. Only fifty years ago the country was in a state of near civil war during the cultural revolution. The more important question is whether other nations will strengthen or weaken their democracies in response.

Historically, many thinkers argued democracy can only be detrimental to a free and just society, characterizing rule by the majority as inherently unstable, irrational, and a threat to private property. The Founding Fathers of the United States of America were acutely aware of this perceived threat and designed the constitution and electoral college to constrain popularly elected leaders with the liberal rights guaranteed by the constitution. Recent events have led some commentators to conclude that the system is broken.

But when we question its merits and seek out its flaws, we should be acutely aware that we live in societies that permit us to criticise, and that this is in itself a crucial right. We should also question what our alternatives would be.

We might imagine the landscape in an authoritarian or dictatorship state: would we expect to receive a fairer trial? To find more balanced information on the internet? To see minority rights more protected? Would a settlement of World War Two imposed by fascist victors, rather than democracies, have created a more just and free peace?

Our flagship newsletter provides a weekly round-up of content, from expert analysis and research to video and audio. It is most likely that democracy needs to be further deepened, by reinvigorating the rights and guarantees enshrined in liberal democracy, and making it more responsive and accountable however we can.

Looking at the alternatives it is fair to conclude that people living in democracies have no alternative. The importance of democracy Why is democracy important to the world and how does it help maintain a just and free society?

One principle of democracy is that all people are equal in the eyes of the law, and every person gets a vote.

For example, Canada has a universal franchise decree in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which explicitly allows every citizen of Canada the right to vote in any Canadian election.

Preventing abuse of power. In democracies, people in authority are usually elected by people who vote them in. They are therefore responsible for carrying out the will of those who elected them. Creating stability. Democracies have rules and laws that provide stability and protect human rights see our guide on Understanding human rights to find out more. Democratic governments have time to make changes that are in the interests of everyone.

What are the problems with democracy? Some of the most common complaints about democracy include: Not everyone exercises their right to vote. In some countries, like Australia, voting is mandatory by law for certain elections - but this is not the case in other democratic countries. Although everyone living in a democracy has the right to vote at a certain age , not everyone actually does it, which means that in the end, not every voice gets heard.

Not everyone has the right to vote. In some democratic countries, there are laws that stop some people from voting. For example, the Representation of the People Act in the UK prevents people who have been convicted of crimes from voting while they are in prison. Decisions can take a long time. The process of changing laws and making decisions about the country has to go through various stages of voting before they come into effect.

This means that carrying out what people want often takes a long time. For example, the United States has an extensive process in which a bill first draft of a law before it is passed must be supported by several levels of government, such government committees, congress members, public officials, and the executive office.

Not everyone who votes is well-informed. Although ordinary citizens are asked to vote on essential issues or who should make decisions for them, not everyone has the specialist knowledge required to understand the full implications of their vote. And of course, politicians themselves often spread misinformation during campaigns, which only makes it harder to stay well-informed of issues.

For example, following the Brexit referendum which saw the majority of the British public vote to leave the EU, GoogleTrends noted a huge spike in search requests on what would happen if Britain were to leave. Why is democracy important for young people?